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ABSTRACT 
Diantara sekian banyak komoditas pertanian yang memainkan peran strategis di 
Indonesia, gula merupakan salah satu produk yang mendapatkan perhatian sangat besar 
dari pemerintah. Masalahnya, sejak beberapa dekade terakhir, industri gula di Indonesia 
mengalami kemerosotan yang luar biasa, baik karena faktor internal maupun eksternal. 
Akibat persoalan ini, Indonesia yang semula menjadi eksportir gula terbesar kedua di 
dunia, saat ini justru menjadi salah satu negara importer gula terbesar di dunia. Secara 
umum, bila dipetakan, masalah pada industri gula di Indonesia berakar dari empat faktor 
beikut: (i) inefisiensi pada level petani; (ii) inefisiensi pada tingkat pabrik gula (iii) 
kebijakan pemerintah yang tidak efektif; dan (iv) perdagangan produk gula sangat distortif 
dalam pasar internasional. Tulisan ini, dengan cara yang berbeda, berargumentasi bahwa 
sebagian dari penyebab kemunduran industri gula nasional disebabkan oleh inefisiensi 
kelembagaan (institutional inefficiency), baik pada level kebijakan kelembagaan 
(institutional environment) maupun kesepakatan kelembagaan (institutional arrangement).  
Keywords:  sugar industry, institutional environment, institutional arrangement, 
transaction costs. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Among various plantation products that 
have strategic roles in Indonesia, sugar is one 
commodity that continually gets attention from 
the government.
1 
Concern has increased 
recently, caused by many factors. As one of 
the primary needs and as a determinant of 
inflation, sugar is an important commodity in 
                                                          
1  The sugar industry in Indonesia reached its glory days 
in 1930, when Indonesia was still colonized by the 
Dutch. At that time Indonesia became the second 
biggest exporter in the world. This gave rise to the 
saying “the sugar industry is the corky wood place 
where the Netherlands floats.” The success of the sugar 
industry can be attributed to two things: the 
management system in planting and the cheap land and 
low labor wages involved in the sugar industry. See 
Mubyarto, et al, Tanah dan Tenaga Kerja Perkebunan: 
Kajian Sosial Ekonomi, Aditya Media, Yogyakarta, 
1992, p. 113 
the Indonesian economy (Susila and Susmiadi, 
2001:1). Its role as a job provider also 
strengthens the important role of the sugar 
industry in Indonesia. This strategic role 
causes the government to make frequent 
interventions in the sugar industry through 
many production and trading policies. 
Unfortunately, in the last two decade, the sugar 
industry in Indonesia began to face many 
awkward problems. One of these has been the 
trend for import volume to continuously 
increase, while at the same time sugar 
production in the country tends to decrease 
(Susila, 2002:A4-1). 
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Table 1: Performance of the Indonesian Sugar Industry in the Past, 1910-1970 
No Description 1910 1920 1930 1940 1952 1960 1965 1970 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Number of factories 
Production (ton mil.) 
Export (ton mil.) 
Import (ton mil.) 
Area (ha thousand) 
Production (ha/ton) 
182 
1.3 
1.3 
- 
126 
10.2 
183 
1.5 
1.5 
- 
157 
10.6 
179 
2.9 
2.8 
- 
92 
17.2 
118 
1.6 
0.9 
- 
92 
17.2 
50 
0.5 
- 
- 
48 
9.1 
55 
0.7 
- 
- 
73 
8.9 
55 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
87 
8.8 
55 
0.7 
- 
0.1 
82 
8.7 
Source: Indikator Ekonomi; Furnivall, 1944:338; Mubyarto, 1969:41; Mubyarto, 1977:31. As quoted by 
Ibrahim, 2003:6 
Because of heavy damage to factories 
during the Revolution, post-independence 
exports never exceeded the 1954 figure of just 
212,000 tons for the whole of Java, and they 
then rapidly fell away, ceasing altogether after 
1966. The sugar industry survived but 
henceforth produced only for the domestic 
market and exported only the by-product 
molasses (Dick, 1995:45). Table 1 shows that 
the number of sugar mills decreased 
drastically, from 182 units in 1910 to only 55 
factories in 1970.
2
 In order to cope with this 
problem, in April 1975 the Government issued 
Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 9/1975, setting 
up the Intensified Smallholder Cane (Tebu 
Rakyat Intensifikasi, hereafter TRI) program 
(Mubyarto, 1977:29; Brown, 1982:39; Isma’il, 
2001:4). Briefly put, the program had two 
objectives: changing the basic structure of the 
industry from one in which the mills grew cane 
on land rented from smallholders to one in 
which the smallholders themselves took on the 
entrepreneurial role producing cane on their 
own land and raising the nation’s total 
production of refined sugar, reducing the 
                                                          
2  Nowadays in Indonesia there are 63 sugar mills (PG), 
which are 54 PG owned by the government which are 
managed by nine state-owned entreprises 
(BUMN/PTPN) with a capacities of 72% and nine sugar 
mills that are managed by privately-owned entreprises 
(BUMS) with capacities of 28%. From a location aspect, 
50 sugar mills are in Java with people smallholder 
pattern and 13 sugar mills are outside of Java with HGU 
(right to engage an enterprise) of dry land. See M. Yamin 
Rahman, Keragaan Pasar Gula Domestik Pasca 
Demonopoli Bulog, Proceeding of P3GI Technical 
Meeting, P3GI, Pasuruan, 2002, p. A1-2 – A1-3  
import bill and eventually achieving self-
sufficiency (Brown, 1982:39; Mardjana, 
1995:96; Bachriadi, 1995:35).
3
  
The experience of the TRI program shows 
that the individual smallholders frequently 
have not received the full benefits of the 
program to which they are entitled (Brown, 
1982:59; Mardjana, 1995:96-97). First, farm 
size: the efficient cultivation of cane generally 
requires blocks of land at least ten hectares in 
area. With average farm sizes in Java of less 
than 0.5 ha, smallholders have had to find 
ways to amalgamate their land, or at least to 
farm cooperatively, if they are to have any 
chance of cultivating cane profitably. Second, 
under the program, the landholder became the 
cultivator and the mill, in a sense, became a 
contractor to the farmer. It is in connection 
with the provision of these services that most 
of the new conflicts between landholders and 
mills have arisen. Third, there have been 
problems related to the institutional setting 
(management) of mills (sugar factories) that 
                                                          
3  This program is modeled on the Bimas (Bimbingan 
Massal/Mass Guidance) system, which aimed to 
modernize the farming enterprise through intensification, 
using modern production methods such as fertilizer, 
pesticides and high-yielding varieties. It was supported 
by government credit at low interest rates, and many 
government institutions such as the BRI (Indonesian 
People’s Bank), KUD (Village Unit Cooperative), Bulog 
(The National Food Agency) and regional governments 
were involved (Basri and Flaming, 1991). For more 
details, see I Ketut Mardjana, Ownership or Management 
Problems? A Case Study of Three Indonesia State 
Enterprises, Bulletin of Indonesian Economics Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 1, April 1995, p. 96  
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usually places farmers in the marginal position, 
for example, in the calculation of sugar content 
(rendemen). As seen in Table 2, since 
implementing TRI policy all productivity 
indicators worsened compared to the previous 
era. With this background, this paper focused 
on efforts to describe the institutional problems 
of Indonesian sugar industry.  
From the explanation, it can be concluded 
that part of problem in the Indonesian sugar 
industry is caused by inefficiency of 
institutions, both “institutional environment” 
(government policies) and “institutional 
arrangement” (agreement among economic 
units). With this background, this paper 
focused on efforts to describe the institutional 
problems of Indonesian sugar industry. The 
approach of analysis uses the institutional 
economics perspective, especially transaction 
cost economics. Transaction cost economics is 
used to analyze the relation between economic 
actors in the sugar industry (external 
transaction costs) and the magnitude of 
transaction costs at incurred sugar mills and by 
sugarcane farmers themselves (internal 
transaction costs).   
THE ROLE OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
IN INDONESIA 
Table 3 shows that the plantation area 
planted with sugarcane is wide enough 
compared with other plantation plants in 
Indonesia. From this size aspect, sugarcane 
occupied the third largest area after palm oil 
and rubber commodities. In 2001, for example, 
the area planted by sugarcane was 406.5 
thousand ha, less than the areas of palm oil 
(2,704.5 thousand ha) and rubber (539 
thousand ha). The sugarcane area is remaining 
stable from year to year (even increasing 
slightly), whereas land area of other 
commodities tends to decrease every year. This 
indicates that the sugarcane commodity is one 
of the most important products in the 
plantation sector in Indonesia. If we compare 
based on region, plantation area in Java is 
61.3% and out of Java is 38.7%. Plantation 
areas in Java are mostly owned by farmers 
(86%), while outside of Java only 7% are 
owned by farmers and 93% are owned by 
BUMN (state-owned enterprise) and private 
plantations. At the national level, farmers’ 
sugarcane plantation area is 56% and the 
remaining 44% are owned by sugar mills 
(Rahman, 2002:A1-2). 
From the aspect of production, for the last 
five years sugar production tended to decrease 
from 2.187 million tons in 1997, to 1.928 
million tons in 1998, then 1.801 million tons in 
1999, but then increased to 1.896 million tons 
in 2000, and increased again to 2.025 million 
tons in 2001 (Table 4). From another aspect, 
sugar consumption rates tended to increase 
with the growth of the population and 
food/drink industries. To cover the deficit, it 
was necessary to import sugar in a great 
volume. Even in 1999, the total import was 
bigger than the sugar production in the 
country.
4
 This condition is aggravated by the 
tendency to reduce the price of import sugar 
from year to year (Rahman, 2002:A1-1). In 
detail, the development of sugar imports from 
1997 to 1999 showed continual increase. In 
1997 sugar import was 1.36 million tons, then 
in 1998 and 1999 it was 1.7 and 2.19 million 
tons, respectively, or an average increase of 
37% every year. But in 2000 sugar import 
decreased to 1.55 million tons and decreased 
again to 1.28 million tons in 2001 (Rahman, 
2002:A1-3). 
                                                          
4  Indonesia has been a sugar-importing country since 
1967. This happened due to increasing demand for sugar 
domestically, while the rate of national sugar 
productivity was low. See Dianto Bachriadi, 
Ketergantungan Petani dan Penetrasi Kapital: Lima 
Kasus Intensifikasi Pertanian dengan Pola Contract 
Farming, Akatiga, Bandung, 1995, p. 34 
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Table 2: Indonesian Sugar Productivity, 1965 – 1998 
No Sugarcane farming enterprise system 
Sugarcane/ha 
(ton) 
Sugar content 
(%) 
Sugar/ha 
(ton) 
1 
2 
3 
Before TRI era  (1965-1975) 
Transition era (1976 – 1982) 
TRI era (1983 – 1998) 
89.3 
78.5 
70.7 
10.09 
9.46 
7.58 
9.01 
7.42 
5.40 
Source: Data P3GI. In: Sumardiko, 2000 (Appendix 3) 
Table 3:  Planted Areas of Indonesian Large Estates at the Beginning of the Year by Type of 
Crops 1997-2001 (thousand ha) 
Type of Crops 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Perennial crops 
   Rubber 
   Coconut 
   Palm oil 
   Coffee 
   Cocoa 
   Tea 
   Kapok 
   Cinchona 
 
557.9 
120.2 
1,739.1 
61.8 
146.3 
89.3 
5.1 
2.3 
 
549.0 
126.1 
1,878.1 
62.5 
151.3 
91.2 
5.1 
0.6 
 
545.0 
93.6 
2,397.8 
63.2 
154.6 
91.6 
5.2 
1.3 
 
541.0 
94.5 
2,548.9 
63.2 
159.2 
91.7 
4.9 
1.3 
 
539.0 
94.6 
2,704.5 
62.9 
162.5 
91.7 
4.9 
1.3 
Annual crops 
   Sugarcane 
   Tobacco 
   Rosella 
 
378.1 
4.5 
2.5 
 
405.4 
5.7 
0.6 
 
391.1 
5.2 
1.6 
 
405.2 
5.2 
1.6 
 
406.5 
5.1 
1.3 
Note:  1) Harvested Area 2) Directorate General of Estates 
Source: BPS, 2001 
Table 4: Production of Indonesian Large Estates by Type of Crops 1997-2001 (thousand tons) 
Type of Crops 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Perennial crops 
   Rubber 
   Coconut 
2)3)
 
   Palm oil 
   Palm kernel 
   Coffee 
   Cocoa 
   Tea 
   Kapok 
3)
 
   Cinchona 
 
330.5 
72.7 
4,081.1 
927.5 
30.6 
65.9 
121.0 
0.7 
0.5 
 
332.6 
87.9 
4,013.1 
912.1 
28.5 
60.9 
132.7 
0.9 
0.4 
 
293.7 
90.9 
4,454.5 
1,012.4 
27.5 
58.9 
126.4 
1.1 
0.9 
 
336.2 
91.7 
4,531.1 
1,034.2 
27.7 
60.6 
127.9 
1.0 
0.9 
 
328.3 
92.7 
4,595.9 
1,047.9 
28.7 
65.3 
129.3 
1.1 
0.9 
Annual crops 
   Sugarcane
1)
 
   Tobacco 
1)
 
   Rosella 
1)
 
 
2,187.2 
7.8 
9.6 
 
1,928.7 
7.7 
3.7 
 
1,801.4 
5.8 
2.3 
 
1,896.4 
6.3 
2.7 
 
2,025.1 
5.1 
2.2 
Note:  1) Including production with raw material from smallholders’ estates 
 2) Copra equivalent 
 3) Directorate General of Estates 
Source: BPS, 2001 
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The average performance of the sugar 
industry in Indonesia can be seen in Table 5. 
The data apparently shows that almost all 
aspects of the sugar industry in Indonesia 
experience a reduction of performance 
prominently, except land size, which relatively 
increases. In the period of 1930-1940, for 
example, land size of only about 95 thousand 
ha produced almost 1.5 million tons of sugar. 
This occurred because most of the area used 
was wetland that can produce higher yields 
(137 tons/ha) and a seed system without ratoon 
(seed applied for one planting season) so that 
its sugar content (sucrose) is very high 
(11.7%).
5
 With this performance, it is not 
surprising that production in which period was 
16-tons sugar/ha. Yet, this achievement 
continuously worsened until the period of 
1995-2000 when production of sugar was 1.8 
million tons yearly (increasing about 20% 
compared with the period of 1930-1940), 
whereas the land size planted increased about 
400% compared with the period of 1930-1940. 
This occurred because most of the sugar land 
in the period of 1995-2000 was dry land so that 
sugar productivity was very low (70 tons/ha) 
and the ratoon system was used (many times 
planting season, even up to 15 times) so that 
sugar content (sucrose) rates were very low 
(6.89%). So it can be predicted that in the 
recent period production would only be 4.82 
tons of sugar/ha. 
Concerning the sugar industry performance 
that has continually worsened, in 2002 the 
government set out the “Acceleration Program 
of National Sugar Productivity Development,” 
with the hope that it can improve sugar quality 
and productivity in Indonesia.
6
 These activities 
                                                          
5  This is known as the Reynoso system, which is replacing 
sugar area from dry land with wetland. This replacing 
aims to develop plants’ productivity by giving them 
growth land that has good drainage. See Dianto 
Bachriadi, ibid, p. 31  
6  It is hoped that by the “Acceleration Program of 
National Sugar Productivity Development,” performance 
of the sugar industry in Indonesia will increase so that 
the objectives of the national sugar reliance will be 
achieved in 2007. The government has set up specific 
are predicted to cost about Rp 350 billion for 
four years. These activities are conducted at 
two levels of organization (Departemen 
Pertanian, 2002:3). First, at the national level 
the “Operational Unit of National Sugar 
Industrial Revitalization” was established with 
the function to guide, monitor, and evaluate the 
implementation in the field. Members of this 
unit include the Department of Finance, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Industry and Commerce, Ministry of BUMN, 
P3GI (Indonesian Sugar Research Institute) 
and APTR (Smallholder Sugarcane Farmers 
Association). Second, in the field the “sugar 
seed industry company, ratoon removing 
service, and irrigation” will be established. 
Sugar Seed Industry Company is established in 
every PTPN/PT of Sugar in Java. Its members 
include of PTPN/PT sugar, regional APTR of 
PTPN/PT sugar, local government, and 
interested investors. 
 
                                                                             
targets to increase sugar productivity by developing land 
size, crystal (sugar), and sugarcane productivity. It is 
expected, for example, in 2007 that sugarcane land size 
will reach about 385 thousand ha, crystal (sugar) 
production will reach 3 million tons, sugarcane 
productivity 88.11 tons/ha, and crystal (sugar) 
productivity 7.74 tons/ha (see Appendix 1). If the targets 
can be achieved, then in 2007 the government will not 
need to import sugar to fulfill domestic sugar needs. Of 
course, this will not be easy because there are many 
problems that must be solved by the national sugar 
industry, from farmers, to sugar mills, to government 
policies themselves. 
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Table 5: Average Performance of Indonesian Sugarcane and Sugar for the Period 1930-2000 
Period 
Land  
(ha) 
Sugarcane 
(tons/ha) 
Sucrose 
content (%) 
White sugar 
(tons/ha) 
Total white 
sugar (tons) 
1930 – 1940 
1983 – 1987 
1998 – 1994 
1995 – 2000 
     95.099 
287.676 
379.669 
378.703 
    137.3 
76.3 
76.3 
70.0 
      11.70 
7.97 
7.45 
6.89 
     16.06 
6.08 
5.77 
4.82 
1,485,099 
1,748,363 
2,190,084 
1,829,094 
Year of highest production reached in every period 
1930 
1986 
1992 
1997 
196.592 
303.740 
402.486 
386.884 
    129.4 
79.2 
79.1 
72.3 
     11.55 
8.05 
7.17 
7.83 
     14.95 
6.38 
6.30 
5.66 
2,938,205 
1,936,525 
2,534,197 
2,190,185 
Source: Soepardi, 2002:A9-3 
 
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE 
INDONESIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY  
Problems that have been encountered by 
the sugar industry in Indonesia recently are 
very complex, and are both internal and 
external. Generally, if we categorize, the sugar 
industry has four basic problems, i.e. (Susila, 
2002:A4-8): (i) inefficiency at the farmers’ 
level; (ii) inefficiency at the sugar mill level; 
(iii) government policy has not effectively 
stimulated the development of the national 
sugar industry; and (iv) the sugar industry and 
trading are very distorted in the international 
market. First, identified inefficiency at the 
farmers’ level comes from the ratoon planting 
pattern system that makes sugar productivity 
decrease. In this ratoon system, planted seed 
can be used many times each planting season 
(even up to 15 times) so it can produce bad 
sugarcane quality. Ideally, seed can only be 
used twice for each planting season. Sugarcane 
farmers use the ratoon system because they 
cannot afford to buy expensive seed every 
planting season. According Soekarso 
(1999:19), after 1988 ratoon plants dominated 
sugarcane plants in Indonesia (for wetland and 
dry land), so the total reached 80%; plants that 
have been ratoon for three times are 20.45%. It 
seems that this condition continuously 
occurred, with the ratoon system usage being 
more intensively done by sugarcane farmers.
7
 
In other words, decreasing productivity is 
caused by behavior changes in sugarcane 
plantations from high-input to low-input as 
rational reactions to changes in the ratio of 
input-output price (Sukarso, 1999:14). Beyond 
this, decreasing productivity is also triggered 
by the changing of sugarcane land type, from 
using wetland to dry land. As seen in Table 
1.6, up until 1998 wetland percentage was only 
29.4% of total land planted by sugar; the 
remaining 70.6% was dry land. The changing 
of this land type has very big influences 
because of the different fertility rates. In 1999, 
average sugarcane productivity in wetland was 
64.2 tons/ha, while sugarcane productivity in 
dry land was 57.3 tons/ha (Kuntohartono, 
2000:16).
8
  
                                                          
7  Widening ratoon sugarcane plants occurred intensively 
after the rent sugarcane system was forbidden and after 
sugarcane was developed in dry land. Besides, 
motivation to manage ratoon sugarcane comes from the 
assumption that production costs can be reduced without 
disturbing the crops, the scarcity of labor, and the 
increased limiting of land that can be cultivated with 
sugarcane. See Kuntohartono and Hendroko, 
Peningkatan Produktivitas Keprasan, Paper presented at 
P3GI Technical Meeting, P3GI, Pasuruan, 1995, p. Pleno 
7-2 
8  Decreasing productivity is also caused by the cut-load-
carry system that seems inefficient because there is no 
adequate coordination between sugarcane farmers and 
the sugar mill. In this condition, there often exist cases in 
which sugarcane that has been cut down cannot be 
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Table 1.6:  Development of Indonesian Sugar-
cane Area Based on Land Types (in 
hectare) 
Year Wetland Dry land Total 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
146.028 
135.737 
135.847 
118.286 
108.864 
276.662 
285.169 
265.452 
268.592 
261.401 
424.690 
420.906 
401.299 
386.878 
370.265 
Source: P3GI. In: Soekarso, 1999:17 
Second, inefficiency at the sugar mill level 
is caused by the sugar mills being too old and 
by management of the sugar mills that is still 
traditional. This reality means that sugarcane 
cannot be well-processed (milled) so the result 
is not maximal. If we describe based on 
ownership, privately-owned sugar mills are 
generally more efficient than are state-owned 
sugar mills (Prabowo, 1998:12). This is 
because most of the privately-owned sugar 
mills are more newly established so that their 
technology is better and they are managed with 
a more professional management system 
compared with state-owned sugar mills. Third, 
government policies are not effective because 
of lack of implementation of the policies, for 
example credits coming to farmers were very 
late. One of sugarcane farmers’ credit sources 
originating from a sugar mill/cooperative, 
where the money comes from the government 
program distributed through assigned banks. 
Banks predetermine then coordinate with sugar 
mills and cooperatives to distribute their 
credits. Sugar mills usually select those 
                                                                             
directly milled by the sugar mill, or sugarcane that 
actually should be cut down is not cut because the sugar 
mill cannot receive it. Certainly this condition causes the 
quality of the sugarcane to worsen. Other writers see that 
decreasing productivity occurred as a result of the 
sugarcane payment system and the system of benefit and 
risk division, which are not in accordance with farmer 
enterprise. The farmers are always encouraged to send 
fresh-clean-sweet sugarcane to the sugar mill, but they 
do not respond to the suggestion because the production 
organizational system and the payment system do not 
give appropriate incentives. See Gunawan Soekarso, 
Gula Nasional: Kondisi Sekarang dan Masa Datang, 
Gula Indonesia, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April – June 1999, p. 
14 
farmers who are entitled to receive credit and 
simultaneously collect their guarantees, while 
the cooperative has the duty to distribute their 
credit. In the implementation, usually farmers 
received credit from cooperatives is often late 
(about two months delay).
9
 Finally, sugar 
import by producer countries make national 
sugar industries collapse. The import sugar that 
is sold at a lower price is not a result of higher 
efficiency compared with Indonesian sugar, 
but is caused by government intervention in 
sugar-producing countries, such as input and 
export subsidies.
10
 In the United States, for 
example, the government since 1981 has 
consistently used domestic policies to support 
the agricultural sector, such as with input 
subsidies (credits). The policy is presently 
formulated as the “Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act),” by 
which farmers get price guarantees in the form 
of loans equal to about US$18/lb for sugarcane 
and US$22.9/lb for sugar-beet. Under this 
policy, about 67% of the income of American 
sugar producers derives from price 
supports/subsidy policy (Davados and Kropf, 
1999; as quoted by Susila, 2002:A4-2).  
In short, the Indonesian sugar industry 
presently faces the same situation as does 
                                                          
9  Sugarcane farmers stated that their production is not 
optimal because their credit is not received on time. For 
example, sometimes farmers cannot fertilize the plants 
in the pre-planting period because credit has not already 
been given. As a consequence of the late fertilizing, 
sugarcane quality is not optimal, which decreases the 
farmers’ revenue. 
10  So far, both developed and developing countries (sugar 
exporter and importer countries), have not seemed to 
decrease the tariff because of each country’s own 
interest. Even countries such as the Philippines, India, 
and Pakistan are giving strong protection to their own 
sugar industries by increasing the import duty tariff of 
import sugar. The same policy is also conducted in 
many developed countries, where they still impose a 
high import tariff on sugar, such as Japan (955.04%), 
European Union (491.19%), and USA (357.40%). See 
Sigit Subiantoro, Upaya Peyelematan Pergulaan 
Nasional dari Kebangkrutan, Proceeding of P3GI 
Technical Meeting, Pasuruan, 2002, p. D1 – 8. In 
comparison, the Indonesian Government imposes low 
import duty. See Gunawan Sukarso, ibid, p. 15.  
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Fiji’s, with what its government calls “core 
inefficiencies.” The series of core 
inefficiencies are: (i) low sugarcane quality; 
(ii) cane burning; (iii) mill inefficiencies; (iv) 
transport inefficiencies; and (v) payment 
systems to farmers (Snell and Prasad, 
2001:261-262). According to some research, 
the inefficiency of the sugar industry is caused 
by a lack of raw materials and decreases in 
productivity and sugar content (Isma’il, 
2001:6-9), milling process inefficiency 
(Martoyo, 2000:10), and sugar loss during cut-
load-carry/TMA (Darmawan, et al, 2000:6). 
However, this research did not study sugar 
industry inefficiency from an institutional 
perspective (Arum, 2000:39), in which the 
institutional factor is very likely to be the 
source of sugar industry inefficiency. These 
have been very specifically pointed towards 
institutional reforms aimed at reducing 
“political interference” in the industry, 
improving farming practices, and related 
measures. In the view of the World Bank, the 
Indonesian sugar industry had moved from 
being a low-cost sugar producer to a high-cost 
producer. Yield-share payment systems to 
sugarcane farmers, failure to invest in new 
equipment and the expansion of production 
onto marginal lands were seen as the likely 
causes for declines in productivity.  
If they are simplified in an issue’s schema 
for the national sugar industry, the problems of 
Indonesia’s sugar industry can be found in 
Appendix 2. First, the cropping system is not 
optimal. As described above, a cropping 
system which is not optimal is caused by many 
factors, for example: (i) cut-back system 
(ratoon) used by sugarcane farmers; (ii) yield-
share system that does not give sugarcane 
farmers incentive to produce better crops; (iii) 
planting and cut systems that are not well-
coordinated; and (iv) spread-out land 
dominated by dry land. All these processes 
ultimately cause a decrease in sugar 
productivity, bad sugar quality, and low sugar 
content (sucrose) rate. Therefore, sugar 
development issues should be mainly 
concerned with whether sugar productivity 
targets will be improved. What must not be 
forgotten is that the issues of development are 
not only concerned with systems of planting, 
finding new seed varieties, and land type 
change; but also with the structuring of 
efficient economic institutions so that yield-
share and cut and planting schedules are 
beneficial for both parts, especially for sugar 
farmers. Without improvement of the 
institutional aspects, it will be difficult to 
improve the performance of the sugar industry 
as a whole. 
Second, management and technology cause 
a decrease in sugar mill performance. Some 
assumptions state that in general sugar 
industries in Indonesia are still efficient, 
although there are about 27 sugar mills that 
have problems and are inefficient. According 
to International LMC (1997), in the case of 
efficiency, Indonesian sugar industries occupy 
21–30 ranks from 62 sugar producers in the 
world, with production costs of US$288 – 310 
per ton. As a comparison, average production 
costs of the 15 countries most efficient are 
US$301.5 per ton (Husodo, 1999:14). Yet 
given the fact that the total number of sugar 
mills in Indonesia nowadays remains at 64 
units (compared with the total number of sugar 
mills in 1930 which reached 182 units), the 
assumption that sugar mills in Indonesia are 
not efficient is reasonable. One of the reasons a 
sugar mill is closed is because of the 
inadequacy of raw material (sugarcane) from 
sugarcane farmers. However, what we should 
not ignore is management performance of the 
sugar industry that is bad (especially state-
owned sugar mills) as a result of high spend-
control. For example, in the process of buying 
equipment (machines), sugar mill management 
must propose to PTPN and its decision usually 
takes a long time to be realized, which disturbs 
the process of production. Indeed, this problem 
includes an institutional aspect, something that 
cannot be understood by most people. 
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Third, government policy and international 
market distortion do not support the interests 
of the domestic sugar industry. So far, the 
government holds control of national sugar 
industry policy through a series of policies 
established, input policy, marketing, price 
determination, and international trading. 
Unfortunately not all the policies benefit the 
domestic sugar industry, and even less so the 
sugarcane farmers. Presidential Instruction No. 
9/1975 about TRI (Intensified Smallholder 
Cane) that began to run between 1985-1988 is 
regarded as the most oppressive policy for 
sugarcane farmers in the history of the 
Indonesian sugar industry. Then, producer 
countries that give high subsidies to domestic 
sugar so that it can be sold at a cheap price to 
the Indonesian market cause international 
market distortion. Additionally, producer 
countries protect their domestic market by 
imposing a very high import duty so that sugar 
from abroad cannot enter.
11
 By comparison, 
the Indonesian government reduces subsidies 
continuously to the sugar industry and imposes 
a very low import duty,
12
 which makes the 
                                                          
11  There are few countries in the world that do not 
intervene in their domestic sugar markets. Perhaps this 
is because both temperate and tropical countries can 
grow sugar. Regardless of the motives for intervention, 
the result is that about three-quarters of the sugar grown 
in the world is consumed in the country of production. 
See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of 
Controls: American Sugar. In: Lee J. Alston, Thrainn 
Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, (eds.), Empirical 
Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 176 
12  Based on the Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree 
(SK Memperindag) No. 230/MPP/Kep/6/1999, the 
government imposes import duty of 20% for raw sugar 
and 25% for white sugar. See Wayan R. Susila and Ali 
Susmiadi, Dampak Tarif Impor Gula Terhadap Industri 
Gula Indonesia, Bulletin P3GI, March, 2001, p. 2. Then 
in 2002, the government set out new import duty 
policies for sugar products Rp 700/kg through Ministry 
of Finance Decree (SK Menteri Keuangan) No. 
324.KM.01/2002. This tariff, indeed, is still low 
compared with other countries’ import duty, such as 
Columbia (130%), South Africa (124%), Thailand 
(104%), Brazil (55%), Bangladesh (200%), the 
Philippines (133%), and Sri Lanka (66%). See Slamet 
Darsosoeprapto, Penyehatan Industri Gula Nasional 
Demi Ketahanan Nasional dan Penyelamatan Puluhan 
price of domestic sugar products unable to 
compete with world sugar prices. Of course, 
this also involves an institutional 
(environment) problem, i.e. government failure 
to create regulations that allow the sugar 
industry to get insurance from policies that 
support operational activities efficiently. 
Therefore, the decreasing performance of 
the Indonesia sugar industry is actually caused 
by inefficiency of institutions
13
, especially in 
managing the relationships among economic 
actors in the sugar industry (institutional 
arrangement). The institutional inefficiency 
can be detected in the high transaction costs in 
the sugar industry, both as farmers’ and as 
sugar mills’ burdens. From the perspective of 
the sugarcane farmers, the institution that 
manages farmers’ relationships with 
cooperatives and sugar mills are not based on 
the same level agreement and are not done 
transparently so that farmers often lose the 
opportunity to make an economic profit 
(opportunity cost). For example, sugarcane 
farmers, theoretically, may easily and freely 
get letter of delivery order (SPTA) from the 
sugar mill, but, in fact, it is not so. Sugarcane 
farmers must pay for getting SPTA or do not 
get it at all so that they must join with other 
farmers (or through brokers). This means 
farmers have an additional expense. Sugarcane 
farmers must even pay special costs that are 
not related to their activities, for example, for 
security and as donations to the village. The 
result can be predicted that this pattern 
ultimately will increase the transaction costs of 
sugarcane farmers.   
                                                                             
Juta Orang Penganggur, Paper presented at National 
Seminar of Indonesian Sugar, held with cooperation of 
LPM-UGM and PTPN (Persero), Yogyakarta, 2000, p. 
18 
13  An institution is defined as a regularity of behavior or a 
rule that is generally accepted by members of a social 
group, which specifies behavior in specific situations, 
and which is either self-policed or policed by an 
external authority. See Malcolm Rutherford, 
Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New 
Institutionalism, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p.182 
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Based on my research at the sugarcane 
farmers’ level can be drawn that the proportion 
of transaction costs is very high for sugarcane 
farmers, even reaching almost 50% of total 
costs spent by sugarcane farmers. These 
transaction costs have excluded other difficult 
(implicit) variables, so transaction costs data in 
this research is actually lower than in reality. 
Finally, from all explanations, there are some 
important conclusions that can be drawn about 
the transaction costs of sugarcane farmers. 
First, in general, the transaction costs 
percentage reaches almost 43% of total costs 
spent by sugarcane farmers; the remaining 
57% is production costs. If costs of land rent 
are excluded from production costs, then the 
composition of production and transaction 
costs is approximately in balance (50% : 50%) 
[Yustika, 2005:181-182].  
At the sugar mill level itself there is much 
evidence that management is not efficient, 
which raises many costs. For example, sugar 
mills must ask for approval from the director 
(PTPN) for buying equipment/machines, but 
the process takes a very long time because it is 
the PTPN itself that will buy the tools. This is 
disruptive to the production process. Sugar 
mills also deliberately determine sugar content 
(sucrose) values and yield-share systems, 
which hurts the farmers. It is impossible for 
farmers themselves to control their sugar 
content value because the process is very 
complex. Government policies also burden 
sugar mills with things, i.e. multiple taxation, 
for water needs.
14
 Last but not least, there is 
much taxation conducted by government 
officials (from central to local) for various 
interests, which also raise transaction costs in 
the sugar mills. Accumulation from all of the 
institutional issues results in inefficiency of the 
sugar industry in Indonesia. From this 
                                                          
14  Interview conducted by the researcher with 
accountancy unit of Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill who 
maintain that since economic decentralization was 
applied in 2001, the sugar mill must pay the same tax 
object (water) to two entities simultaneously 
(Dispenda/Board of District Revenue and Jasa Tirta).  
perspective, inefficiency in the sugar industry 
can be seen not only in terms of production 
costs but also of transaction costs generated.  
Besides, sugar mills’ management is also 
not efficient. In the context of institutional 
economics analysis, sugar mill managerial 
transaction costs can be divided into two 
groups. Internal managerial transaction costs 
are defined as transaction costs generated from 
the corporate internal management model, for 
example policies of wage rate, facilities, and 
maintenance. At this level, the amount of 
transaction costs depends on how efficient the 
management institution is in supporting the 
production process. External managerial 
transaction costs are transaction costs related 
to the authority of the management in decision-
making. In the case of the sugar mill, in 
general the sugar mill management (Chief 
Executive Officer, hereafter CEO) does not 
have absolute authority to make decisions 
because all proposals must get approval from 
the Board of Directors (hereafter BoD) [PTPN 
for state-owned sugar mill].
15
 The problem is 
that the BoD often does not know exactly the 
real needs of the sugar mill (kinds of needs and 
time frames) so that the BoD disturbs the 
production process. In this case, centralized 
decision-making management generates high 
transaction costs for the sugar mill, which 
indicates institutional inefficiency in the 
corporation’s management. 
Based on my research about transaction 
and production costs in the sugar mills some 
conclusions can be drawn (Yustika, 2005:154). 
First, transaction costs make a high 
contribution to the total costs of the sugar mill 
(about 50%). This fact illustrates that sugar 
                                                          
15 For example, in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill - Malang, 
according to Wiwied WILUYO (Chief of Factory Unit), the 
management of the sugar mill is only given a limited 
authority to manage daily operational activity, and the 
other activities are determined by the BoD (PT. RNI) 
located in Surabaya. The BoD has full authority to buy raw 
material (as in chemistry materials and machine tools), 
make investment substitutes (like office inventories and 
tools), acquire new equipment, purchase transportation 
tools, and plan investment.  
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mill institutions have not been efficient, so 
they generate high transaction costs. Second, 
from the composition of transaction costs, 
managerial transaction costs are the highest 
contributors to total transaction costs (above 
70%). These results give more detailed 
information that the management of sugar 
mills is less efficient, which contributes to high 
transaction costs. Internally, sugar mill 
management has not applied a good planning 
and supervising system so every performed 
activity always raises high transaction costs, 
for example, the mark-up practice. Externally, 
management of the sugar mill does not have 
authority to make strategic decisions, for 
example, investment decisions, spare parts 
purchasing, and goods acquisition. All 
activities are under the authority of the BoD, 
which causes the production process to be 
disturbed. In other words, the centralization of 
decision-making causes high transaction costs 
for the sugar mills.  
CONCLUSION 
From the last explanation, it can be 
concluded that part of the inefficiency in the 
Indonesian sugar industry is caused by 
inefficiency of institutions, both “institutional 
environment” (government policies) and 
“institutional arrangement” (agreement among 
economic units). The implication is that 
inefficient institutions generate high 
transaction costs in sugar industry activities. 
The high transaction costs involve sugar mills 
and sugarcane farmers, and relate to other 
organizations or regulations, such as 
cooperatives and government policies. This 
paper suggests some important policy 
implications to improve the institutional design 
of the sugar industry in Indonesia. First is 
improvement of contractual arrangements of 
sugarcane farmers. This paper argues that 
cooperatives and APTR (Smallholder 
Sugarcane Farmers’ Association) should be 
improved so that the organizations will stand 
for farmers’ interests. It is also important to 
establish an intermediary institution that is able 
to control the milling process in sugar mills.  
Second is corporate governance reform of 
sugar mills. This study argues that there are at 
least two institutional problems causing 
management inefficiency in sugar mills: (i) a 
share ownership structure that is concentrated 
with a few capital owners (both state and 
privately-owned sugar mills); and (ii) a very 
centralized model of corporate governance, 
where the Board of Directors (BoD) holds the 
corporation fully. Third is the institutional 
change process in the sugar industry. The 
process of institutional change in sugar mills 
can be done on two levels simultaneously: 
demand of constituents and supply of 
institutions. On the demand of constituent’s 
side, the demand of sugarcane farmers that 
sugar mills should implement a transparency 
principle and accountability in milling 
management may join with sugar mill 
management’s demand to the BoD to get wider 
authority in running the corporation. 
Furthermore, on the supply of institutions side, 
institutional change of sugar mills can take 
place because of external factor pressures, such 
as government policies and the higher 
competition in the era of liberalization 
(globalization). The globalization era forces 
every corporation to improve efficiency and 
innovation in all fields, including sugar 
production.  
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Appendix 1: Objectives of Indonesian Sugar Productivity 2002-2007 
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Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
I. Java  
1. Land (ha) 
2. Crystal (tons) 
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 
5. Rendement (%)  
 
215.664 
1,053.801 
75.87 
4.89 
6.43 
 
218.115 
1,186.913 
79.02 
5.44 
6.92 
 
220.198 
1,358.437 
83.26 
6.17 
7.63 
 
222.084 
1,531.907 
87.25 
6.90 
8.00 
 
222.505 
1,643.200 
89.11 
7.39 
8.42 
 
223.928 
1,759.861 
90.79 
7.86 
8.75 
II. Outside of Java  
1. Land (ha) 
2. Crystal (tons) 
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 
5. Rendement (%)  
 
131.558 
837.240 
75.76 
6.36 
8.40 
 
142.165 
885.662 
74.87 
6.23 
8.35 
 
145.462 
979.470 
79.44 
6.73 
8.52 
 
151.732 
1,065.206 
81.49 
7.02 
8.66 
 
155.425 
1,119.918 
82.54 
7.21 
8.77 
 
161.845 
1,227.873 
84.41 
7.59 
9.02 
III. Indonesia  
1. Land (ha) 
2. Crystal (tons) 
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 
5. Rendement (%) 
 
347.222 
1,891.041 
75.83 
5.45 
7.19 
 
360.280 
2,072.575 
77.38 
5.75 
7.48 
 
365.660 
2,337.907 
81.74 
6.39 
7.99 
 
373.816 
2,597.113 
84.91 
6.95 
8.26 
 
377.930 
2,763.118 
86.41 
7.31 
8.56 
 
385.773 
2,987.734 
88.11 
7.74 
8.86 
Note: * Quoted from Department of Agriculture, 2002:4 
Source: Program of National Sugar Productivity Development Acceleration, Book 1  
Department of Agriculture, in Sugar Observer, No.19/2003:5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Problems of the Indonesian Sugar Industry and Government Policy 
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Source: Modified from SUSILA, 2002: A4 – 9  
International 
market distortion 
 
Ratoon  
seed 
 
Yield-share 
system 
 
Low price/ 
fluctuation 
Plant and cut 
schedule 
Cane 
quality 
Cutting 
system 
Government 
policy 
Decreasing of 
sugar content 
Decreasing of 
productivity 
Too old of 
Sugar mill  
Decreasing 
of cane land 
Lack of 
capacity 
Sugar mill 
consolidation 
Investment in 
out of Java 
Decreasing of 
production 
Increasing of 
consumption 
Impacts: 
- Increasing of import 
- Existency of sugar industry  
- Socio-economic stability 
 
 
 
 
Sub-optimal 
cropping Dry land  
